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During the 1990s the Chilean economy gradually cut its inflation
rate from figures in the thirties to 4.7 percent in 1998. Central bank
authorities have declared that the main objective of monetary policy
is to reduce inflation to levels comparable to those in industrial coun-
tries. The designated instrument of that monetary policy has been an
indexed interest rate,1 through which the central bank has sought to
influence the path of real market rates over different time horizons.
These market rates, in turn, are believed to have influenced the be-
havior of spending and aggregate production, thereby managing the
inflationary process in a manner consistent with the proposed stabili-
zation goals. This apparent success deserves a closer look, because,
in the words of Robert Lucas (1996), “Central bankers and even some
monetary economists talk knowledgeably of using high interest rates
to control inflation, but I know of no evidence from even one economy
linking these variables in a useful way.”
Several earlier studies of the Chilean economy have confirmed
the lack of solid empirical evidence of a systematic relationship be-
tween inflation and interest rates (see appendix B). Also, in those
cases where some statistical support exists for such a relationship,
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the transmission mechanism is not specified satisfactorily. It is fre-
quently argued that increases in policy interest rates allow the gap
between the growth rates of aggregate spending and GDP, or be-
tween actual and potential GDP, to be reduced, thereby decelerating
inflation. However, monetary theory states that the path of inflation
must be linked to a nominal variable. Therefore, in order to under-
stand the connection between interest and inflation rates, it is neces-
sary to study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy,
including the relevant nominal variables.
This paper analyzes Chilean monetary policy during the 1986-97
period, identifying the instruments, intermediate targets, and goals
defined by the central bank. This analysis allows us to determine
and study the central bank’s reaction function empirically. Differ-
ent transmission mechanisms are reviewed in an effort to reach a
better understanding of the central bank’s reaction function; these
mechanisms are empirically evaluated using the structural vector
autoregressive (VAR) methodology. We have chosen VAR as our
econometric tool in this paper in order to make our results compa-
rable with those of a number of earlier studies. However, as will be
explained in detail below, recent international literature shows cat-
egorically the need to complement the traditional VAR approach
with identification assumptions based on theory and on institutional
considerations, thereby creating what are now known as structural
VAR systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is a conceptual dis-
cussion of monetary policy administration and the reaction function
used by the central bank during 1986-97. Section 2 analyzes different
possible transmission mechanisms of Chilean monetary policy. Sec-
tion 3 reviews the structural VAR methodology, presents empirical
results, and offers some interpretations. Section 4 concludes.
1. MONETARY POLICY MANAGEMENT IN CHILE:
INSTRUMENTS AND GOALS
During the 1986-98 period Chilean monetary policy considered the
use of various instruments and intermediate objectives in order to
achieve certain goals. Instruments are those variables that the
central bank can control directly. Intermediate objectives, in turn,
are those variables not controlled closely by the monetary policymakers,
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the instruments. These intermediate objectives are supposedly
closely related to the end goals that the central bank would like to
achieve.
1.1 Goals
According to the law governing the central bank’s operations, the
goals of the central bank are currency stability, a stable internal pay-
ments system, and the normal operation of the external payments
system. The first goal has been construed as meaning control of infla-
tion, even though the law suggests that it should be conceived as
price level stability.
The objective of a stable domestic payments system has been ad-
dressed through explicit guarantees granted to bank deposits (up to a
certain limit). These guarantees, although not provided directly by
the central bank, are backed by it as the lender of last resort.
Finally, external payments stability has been thought of as mean-
ing the maintenance of a sustainable current account deficit.2 Given
the past experience of the Chilean and other economies, the central
bank has theorized that this deficit should not exceed 3 to 4 percent
of GDP on average. To do otherwise, the central bank believes, would
sooner or later result in speculative attacks against the domestic cur-
rency and a capital outflow, forcing the country into a costly adjust-
ment. In addition, the goal of external payments stability has been
interpreted as maintaining a certain level of stability of the real ex-
change rate—the other side of the current account deficit coin.
Over the years the central bank has changed the relative impor-
tance it assigns to each of these goals, along with some degree of
what might be called a “crisis mentality,” which is a common element
in monetary policy management.3 Thus, after the debt crisis of 1982-
83, the primary objective was to reduce the current account deficit,
and this effort led to a huge adjustment of both private and public
spending. At the same time, the objective of a “high and stable” real
exchange rate was decided on, to strengthen the export sector and
allow the country’s huge foreign debt to be repaid. As a result, during
the 1980s the objective of low inflation was secondary, subordinated
2. Such an interpretation is questionable. For example, Rosende (1998) ar-
gues that this objective cannot be achieved through monetary policy, and that
therefore it should be interpreted as having a monetary policy that will not gener-
ate an exchange rate crisis or a balance of payments crisis.
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to that for the real exchange rate, until by the end of the decade voluntary
capital flowed back in, thereby relaxing the external constraint.
Later, during the 1990s, the central bank’s principal objective
became the control and gradual reduction of inflation. However,
the objectives for the real exchange rate and the current account
have remained in place, as demonstrated by the central bank’s sus-
tained sterilized intervention in the exchange market during the
period, together with the active implementation of controls on capi-
tal inflows. Nevertheless, the current account deficit, as corrected
by the long-term trend in the terms of trade, has been continually
deteriorating since 1993 (table 1).
1.2 Instruments
The variable selected by the central bank for its monetary policy
instrument from the mid-1980s to April 1995  was the “UF” or past-
CPI-indexed interest rate on its ninety-day obligations, which were
auctioned at a fixed rate. The case for using an interest rate as an
instrument, and in particular a real rate as opposed to the common
central bank practice of using a nominal rate, is related to the vari-
ability of the demand for money and to the desire of the central
bank to disclose certain information, as argued by Fontaine (1991).
Fontaine argues that if the monetary policy objective is informa-
tional, then in an indexed economy the best instrument is a real
interest rate, since it is clear that nominal rate movements are not
always matched by changes in the real rate. Using the nominal rate
as a monetary policy instrument in such a situation may give mis-
leading signals to private economic agents. In contrast, the real in-
terest rate is expected not only to determine the path of spending,
but also to communicate the central bank’s perceptions of the state
of the economy in terms of domestic and external equilibrium. Al-
though Fontaine recognizes that the demand for money is stable,
its velocity is believed to be highly variable given the huge fluctua-
tions in nominal interest rates caused by the UF mechanism. This
makes the use of a monetary aggregate as a monetary policy instru-
ment infeasible and therefore is believed to bias the decision in
favor of the real interest rate.4
4. However, because the UF rate reflects lagged inflation, interest rates using
this indexing mechanism do not strictly correspond to the real interest rate. See
Calvo and Mendoza (1997).Monetary Policy in Chile: A Black Box? 201











Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Bank of Chile data.
a. Using long-term trend in the terms of trade.
Most authors recognize that the instrument actually used has been
an interest rate (see appendix A). However, Rosende and Herrera (1991)
find that money supply movements are a better predictor of transitory
fluctuations in GDP growth than is interest rate variation (see appen-
dix B). This result suggests that, even when it is using the interest
rate as an instrument, the central bank monitors the evolution of the
money supply. In this regard, Rojas (1993) holds that the monetary
authorities have not used a monetary aggregate as an intermediate
objective because, although money does affect output in the short run,
a stable relationship between money and nominal output exists only
for the M2A and M3 aggregates, whose use as intermediate objectives
is considered limited by the imperfect control that the central bank
has over them.
In May 1995 the central bank decided to change its monetary
policy instrument, dropping the ninety-day rate in favor of a shorter-
term rate: the interbank one-day rate. The goal was to give the mar-
ket a greater role in determining medium- and long-term interest
rates. Thus the central bank auctions out its ninety-day obligations
so that the market determines the interest rate. In this way, ex-
pected capital gains (or losses) are prevented from generating sharp
changes in term composition, as used to occur when the ninety-
day rate was fixed, causing liquidity management problems for the
central bank.5
5. For a detailed analysis see Budnevich and Pérez (1995).
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1.3 Intermediate Objectives
In accordance with the monetary policy transmission mecha-
nisms discussed below, the central bank has used as its main in-
termediate objectives the spending-output gap and the gap between
actual and potential output, both their levels and their growth rates
(appendix A). The then-president of the central bank, Roberto Zahler,
justified the 1995 interest rate increase with the following argument:
“...we must not forget that both aggregates, that is the economic ac-
tivity and the demand, continue to grow now for the fifth quarter in a
row, significantly above conservative estimations on the economy’s
productive potential increase and, therefore, above its trend level,
with the resulting pressures over domestic prices.”6
On another occasion Zahler stated:
“...it is important to differentiate between output and spending lev-
els and growth rates. When the economy has had several years of
growth above its potential, and it is also very near it, it is not enough
to go back to growing at the potential output rate. If the appropriate
levels are to be recovered, it is necessary to grow at a below-poten-
tial pace for some time.... This will permit us to return to the desired
path in terms of output and spending levels and reduce inflationary
pressures.... Regarding domestic demand, we must note that it has
grown so strongly in the past few years that it has gone over the
potential output level, pushing prices up and generating pressures
on foreign accounts. An adjustment is needed, then, to take the do-
mestic demand to more reasonable levels... we use all kinds of indi-
cators to predict price behavior, such as the aforesaid gap between
potential and actual output, the evolution of wages, exchange rates,
government spending, credits, money supply, and others.” (Zahler,
1994).
For these intermediate instruments to be operational, they must
respond to the policy instrument in a predictable way. In other words,
an interest rate increase must decelerate the growth rate of spending
by more than that of output, in the case of the spending-output gap,
and it must decelerate the growth rate of output directly or through
slowing spending, in the case of the actual-potential output gap. Thus,
for example, Eyzaguirre and Rojas (1996) argue that “Monetary policy
6. Speaking at a seminar on Latin American World Trade and Perspectives for
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has been based, for over a decade, on the control of the interest rate of
some of the financial instruments offered by the Chilean Central Bank.
The grounds for this policy have been the influence that these rates
have, directly or indirectly, over the expansion rhythm of aggregate
spending and thereby on prices, especially of non tradables.”
1.4 Intermediate Objectives and the Central Bank’s
Reaction Function
When setting its annual inflation goals and its implicit goals for
the trend deficit in the current account (a maximum of 4 percent of
GDP at trend prices), the central bank adjusts the interest rate in-
strument according to the evolution of the intermediate objectives
just described. As already noted, the central bank has used as its
intermediate objectives the rate of growth of spending with respect
to the growth in output (the spending-output gap), and the evolution
of actual GDP with respect to potential GDP, considering both their
levels and their growth rate. Thus, whenever the monetary authori-
ties have found spending to be growing faster than GDP, or actual
GDP to be growing faster than potential GDP, over a few quarters,
they have sought to adjust growth in spending through the interest
rate instrument. In recent years the manipulation of the interest
rate has been related to the application of the well-known Taylor rule
(Taylor, 1993). According to this rule, the interest rate is adjusted
upward when the inflation rate exceeds the target and/or output is
above its potential level, and downward in the contrary case. This
rule can be represented by the following equation:
 , b a d
*      Y R (1)
where dR is the first difference of the interest rate, Y is the output
gap,7  and *  stand for the inflation rate and the inflation target,
respectively, and a and b are positive parameters.
On the other hand, the literature on inflation targeting empha-
sizes that the central bank’s expected inflation (that is, its inflation
forecast) is the intermediate objective par excellence (Masson, Savastano,
and Sharma, 1997). Thus the monetary policy instrument responds to the
7. Measured as the percentage deviation from potential output, or as the
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difference between projected inflation and the inflation target for a speci-
fied period. Within this context, the central bank’s reaction function is
forward-looking, as distinguished from a reaction policy that responds to
intermediate objectives as represented by past readings of certain vari-
ables. In this approach, the monetary policy’s operating method can be
depicted by the following function:
 , d

       j t
e
j t t I (2)
where dIt 
is the change in the monetary policy instrument in period t,
e




 and represent expected inflation and the inflation target
for period t + j, respectively. Within this analytical framework, ex-
pected inflation is generated from a series of statistical models com-
bining several indicators. Thus the basic difference between this
monetary policy model and that described by equation (1) is that the
former uses expected rather than past or present inflation to manage
the policy instrument.
However, this inflation targeting scheme is compatible with Taylor’s
monetary rule inasmuch as it can be argued that the output gap is
the principal determinant of the central bank’s inflation forecasts.
Massad (1998) suggests that monetary policy may actually be man-
aged nowadays according to an inflation targeting scheme, consider-
ing activity and employment indicators, the spending-output gap, the
current account balance, monetary aggregates, wage growth, and the
yield curve. This set of indicators supposedly permits the central bank
to develop a forecast of the path of core inflation and thereby adjust
its instrument according to the gap between the forecasted and the
targeted inflation rates.
2. MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS
The channels whereby the real interest rate can affect the final
targets for inflation, the current account, and the real exchange rate
can take a number of forms. Here we identify five possible transmis-
sion mechanisms: the Australian mechanism, the Phillips curve
mechanism, the interest rate parity mechanism, the monetarist
mechanism, and the credit mechanism.Monetary Policy in Chile: A Black Box? 205
2.1 The Australian Mechanism
The Australian mechanism takes the so-called Australian model
as its theoretical framework.8 The model’s main assumptions are the
following: the economy is a small, open economy that produces and
consumes tradable and nontradable goods; capital is a specific factor
in both sectors; labor is mobile between sectors and is subject to di-
minishing returns; the domestic price of the tradable good is deter-
mined according to purchasing power parity, the nominal exchange
rate, and the international price; and the relative price of nontradables
is determined by their supply and demand equilibrium. Within this
context, the real exchange rate, defined as the relative price of
tradables to nontradables, depends inversely on the level of aggre-
gate spending with respect to output.9 The reason is that an increase
in spending over output will result in an increase in demand for both
tradables and nontradables, thereby creating excess demand in both
markets. In the tradable goods market, this will merely result in
increased net imports and therefore in a drop in the trade account
balance. The excess demand for nontradables, on the other hand,
requires an increase in the relative price of those goods in order to
achieve equilibrium in the nontradable sector, with a resulting ap-
preciation in terms of the real exchange rate.
Taking a closer look at the version of this model presented in Kamin
(1996), these considerations can be expressed algebraically as follows:
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Substituting equation (3) into equation (4), we have
8. See, for example, Dornbusch (1980).
9. The equilibrium real exchange rate here is the one that clears the
nontradables sector. From a long-term perspective, however, it should also meet
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Equation (3) reflects the fact that the equilibrium real exchange
rate (TCRE) in the Australian model is inversely related to the spend-
ing-output ratio (G/Y). Equation (4), in turn, indicates that, in the
context of a predetermined nominal exchange rate and slow price
adjustment, the convergence of the actual real exchange rate (TCR)
toward equilibrium takes place through variations in the inflation
of nontradables (n). From this it follows that inflation of nontradables
will depend on the gap between TCR and TCRE. Finally, equation
(5) shows that the evolution of nontradables inflation is determined
by the spending-output ratio and by the actual real exchange rate
lagged one period.
Within this analytical framework the exchange rate system
will determine how the real exchange rate will adjust, and there-
fore the effect on the price-level path associated with changes in
relative prices. Thus, in a fixed exchange rate system, the appre-
ciation in terms of the real exchange rate takes place through
the acceleration of inflation of nontradables.10 In contrast, if the
exchange rate floats, the reduction in the real exchange rate oc-
curs through a nominal appreciation, reducing tradable goods in-
flation. Therefore the relationship between the spending-output
gap and the inflation rate may be either positive or negative,
depending on the exchange rate system.
Accordingly, in the context of this model, the relationship be-
tween the monetary policy instrument and the inflation rate must go
through the spending-output relationship. Thus, if the long-term real
interest rate determines the evolution of investment expenses and
durable goods consumption, then the manipulation of the short-
term interest rate by the central bank, through its effect on long-
term rates, can reduce the spending-output gap and increase the
equilibrium real exchange rate.11 This, in turn, within a pre-fixed or
indexed exchange rate system, will result in reduced inflationary
pressures. In this sense it must be kept in mind that during the past
10. Strictly speaking, the exchange rate adjustment to a transitory demand
shock may take place through an increase in the price level without a variation in
trend inflation. However, in an indexed economy inflation has an inertial compo-
nent, and therefore any price-level adjustment manifests itself in an increase in
inflation. In particular, the inflationary effect associated with a relative price
correction will appear especially strong in those cases where indexation affects
the nominal exchange rate.
11. In the short run the deceleration in the growth of spending will also
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ten years Chilean exchange rate policy has consisted of an exchange
rate band whose midpoint adjusts to past inflation, together with
corrections for foreign inflation and productivity. This introduces a
significant degree of indexing of the nominal exchange rate.
As shown in figure 1, variation in the nominal exchange rate
trended downward between the first quarter of 1990 and the second
quarter of 1995, reflecting the gradual reduction in inflation and
sporadic discrete revaluations through adjustments in the band’s
midpoint or in its width.12 These corrections to the exchange rate
rule permitted a growing fraction of the relative price correction
associated with the evolution of the spending-output gap to be ac-
complished through the nominal exchange rate, instead of through
inflation of nontradable goods.
The above analysis suggests that the gradual decline in inflation
is tied to the path of the nominal exchange rate. In fact, as figure 2
shows, whenever the spending-output gap narrows, a deceleration
of nontradables inflation follows, but in periods where the gap in-
creases, inflation remains constant. This behavior can be explained
by the fact that, whenever the gap increases, the growth rate of the
nominal exchange rate decreases and even becomes negative in some
periods, as can be seen in figure 1.
Figure 1. Changes in the Nominal Exchange Rate in Chilea
12. The band’s midpoint also takes into account the evolution of the Deutsche
mark-dollar and Japanese yen-dollar parities. For a detailed analysis of Chile’s
exchange rate policy see Vergara (1994).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Bank of Chile data.
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2.2 The Phillips Curve Mechanism
The second transmission mechanism is based on the famous
Phillips curve, augmented by inflation expectations (Friedman, 1976).
According to this approach, if actual output (y) exceeds the economy’s
potential output (yp), or if the natural rate of unemployment exceeds
actual unemployment, then in the short run, actual inflation of wages
and prices () will accelerate with respect to the expected rate (e).
The inverse relationship, where causality goes from the inflation rate
to the unemployment rate, results from a slow adjustment of infla-
tion expectations, rigid prices and wages, or lack of policy credibility.
Actually, a short-run Phillips curve is possible only if actual inflation
differs from expected inflation. In the long run, therefore, there is no
trade-off between unemployment and inflation, because the adjust-
ment of expected inflation to actual inflation results in an unemploy-
ment rate equal to the natural rate and in actual GDP in line with
potential GDP.
Equation (6) shows the Phillips curve augmented by inflation
expectations:
 . 0 c , c      

p t t y y (6)
Figure 2. Changes in Inflation of Nontradables and the
Spending-GDP Gapa
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Bank of Chile data.
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Assuming static expectations (the basis of the accelerationist hypoth-
esis of the Phillips Curve),  1     t
e
t , and therefore the change in
inflation will equal.13
  . c d p t y y    (7)
What counts here is the level of actual output compared with its po-
tential, because an economy can grow faster than its potential for
some time without inflationary pressures emerging, if initial output
is below potential.14
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy in this theo-
retical context can be described as follows. Whenever the trend of
GDP growth is above that of potential GDP growth, after a while
GDP will rise above its potential. Then an increase in the interest
rate permits spending growth to decelerate, which in turn slows
the growth of GDP until its level returns to that of potential GDP.
In addition, the higher interest rate may have a direct effect on
actual output by making working capital more expensive. Thus
the deceleration of GDP growth may also reduce the inflation rate
to the level determined by the nominal anchor (this may be the
exchange rate, a monetary aggregate, or the inflation target de-
termined by policymakers), which in steady state will equal ex-
pected inflation.
The output gap approach is widely used in the empirical literature
on inflation determinants. As pointed out by Coe and McDermott (1997),
the available evidence on industrial countries suggests that such a gap
is an important determinant of inflation. For the Asian emerging econo-
mies as well, these authors find that the output gap plays a significant
role in the evolution of inflation. However, for a large number of de-
veloping countries, the evidence shows no relationship between the
output gap and inflation.15 As for the Chilean case, Mendoza and
Fernández (1994) show evidence favoring this relationship.
13. Naturally, expectations may be rational; however, the simplifying assump-
tion of static expectations captures the essence of the transmission mechanism to
be applied to empirical studies. See Coe and McDermott (1997).
14. Zahler (1994) has argued in favor of the levels of actual and potential output
being more important than the growth rates. See the previous section.
15. On this matter see International Monetary Fund (1996).210 Ángel Cabrera and Luis Felipe Lagos
2.3 The Interest Rate Parity Mechanism
The interest rate parity mechanism is based on international arbi-
trage of interest rates. Thus, whenever a country’s domestic interest
rate exceeds the foreign rate (corrected for devaluation expectations
and country risk), it induces a capital inflow, a nominal appreciation of
the domestic currency, a drop in inflation, and an increased current
account deficit financed by a capital account surplus. Capital mobility
thus ensures that the domestic interest rate cannot remain out of line
with the foreign rate, and in a fixed exchange rate system, that same
mobility also implies that the central bank loses its ability to set mon-
etary policy autonomously. Here the question for policymakers is
whether to stabilize the exchange rate and abandon monetary policy
independence, or to retain the interest rate as a monetary policy in-
strument and settle for greater exchange rate variability.
In Chile during the 1990s the domestic real interest rate, adjusted
for real exchange rate expectations and country risk, stayed consis-
tently above the foreign rate. The resulting massive capital inflows
were partially sterilized, in such a way that the central bank accumu-
lated substantial reserves. This imposed significant losses on the cen-
tral bank, because it issued bonds at a UF rate that was above the
rate it obtained on its dollar-denominated assets. In order to reduce
the effect of capital inflows, the central bank imposed a 30 percent
reserve requirement on foreign credits and investments not of a “pro-
ductive” nature. However, as Valdés and Soto (1998) concluded, this
reserve requirement did not reduce the total amount of short-term
capital but only affected its composition.16
According to the above, interest rate arbitrage has resulted in a
changed portfolio composition, with the private sector borrowing in
foreign currency and acquiring UF-denominated assets, while the
opposite has happened with the central bank’s portfolio. So, suppos-
edly, there has been no direct effect on the level of aggregate spend-
ing, and therefore the real exchange rate has not been affected by the
spending-output gap mechanism.17 However, this did not necessarily
prevent a transitory real appreciation of the peso through a nominal
16. Recently, in the wake of the Asian crisis, the central bank has reduced the
reserve requirement to zero.
17. In the medium and the long run, the increase in the domestic interest rate
should increase the real exchange rate, in accordance with the spending-output
relationship.Monetary Policy in Chile: A Black Box? 211
appreciation, and thus a drop in tradables inflation may have been
generated. Actually, the accumulation of international reserves
may have led to the currency appreciating within its band.18 This,
together with a relatively slower price adjustment of goods than of
the exchange rate, may have caused, in the short run, a real ap-
preciation and a deflationary trend in the prices of nontradable
goods.
On the other hand, with the exchange rate remaining close to
the band’s floor for long periods, the resulting continued accumula-
tion of reserves and a number of discrete modifications to the ex-
change rate band have taken their toll on its credibility. This has
led to expectations of a nominal revaluation, which, in the presence
of price inflexibilities, would also mean a real appreciation, at least
in the short run. This has further strengthened the incentives for
capital inflows, causing the central bank to have to endure several
episodes of speculative attacks. Often it has been forced to validate
the market’s expectations, either by extending the band’s limits or
by realignment of its midpoint. For example, toward the end of 1994
the central bank accumulated over $2 billion in just two months,
requiring it to modify the exchange rate band in November, thereby
permitting a substantial appreciation.
In addition, to the extent that the announcement of a decreas-
ing inflation target determines a certain expected path for nominal
exchange rate variation, implying a reduced real exchange rate, high
domestic interest rates become irresistibly attractive for capital in-
flows.19 In this context, short-term real exchange rate swings in-
duced by the nominal appreciation will be out of equilibrium, and
therefore the actual and the equilibrium exchange rate will become
misaligned. This, in turn, will introduce new deflationary pressures
on nontradables.
However, an alternative hypothesis cannot be ruled out, namely,
that nominal appreciation only accommodates the equilibrium real
appreciation. In this case individuals would expect a real apprecia-
tion based on the evolution of fundamental variables (relative sector
productivity, the spending-output ratio, government spending, the
terms of trade, and the like). The result would be to increase the gap
18. On the effects of sterilized intervention on the exchange rate, see Edison
(1993).
19. On this matter see Rosende (1998).212 Ángel Cabrera and Luis Felipe Lagos
between domestic and foreign interest rates and to stimulate capital
inflows to validate these expectations.20
2.4 The Monetarist Mechanism
The monetarist transmission mechanism is based on the mon-
etarist hypothesis of the economic cycle, according to which an unan-
ticipated change in the nominal money supply affects inflation and
output in the short run. In contrast to the Keynesian approach, this
theoretical scheme not only considers the interest rate as a trans-
mission mechanism, but also contemplates the effects thereof through
a set of asset prices and real wealth. Thus, in this approach, varia-
tions in the money supply affect interest rates and the prices of stocks,
land, and durable goods. All these variations in relative prices will
affect consumption and investment through multiple wealth effects
and substitution effects.
Under the interest rate policy that the central bank has been
following over the last fifteen years, an interest rate increase results
in a smaller monetary expansion during the process of adjusting to
the new equilibrium. This has a negative effect on prices of other
assets and, ultimately, on spending, output, and the rate of inflation.
It is often argued that, whenever monetary policy uses the
interest rate as its instrument, nominal money will be endogenous,
so that observed variations in the nominal money supply will re-
spond to movements in the demand for money. However, when-
ever the central bank chooses to change the level of the interest
rate, it does so through exogenous changes in the money supply.
Certainly, once the new equilibrium has been reached, money sup-
ply movements become endogenous again.21
20. Zahler (1997) argues in favor of this hypothesis: “we cannot overstate that
the real appreciation of the Chilean peso during the nineties, around 4.5% per
year, was the result of an equilibrium process, that responded to the structural
changes of the Chilean economy over the past years, and not to an exchange rate
manipulation with the purpose of artificially reducing the inflationary trend.” On
the other hand, Rosende (1998) believes that the interest rate policy stressed the
downward trend of the real exchange rate.
21. Unpublished results of the authors indicate that some correlation exists
between money market imbalances and an acceleration of GDP. For Rosende and
Herrera (1991), money market imbalances can be attributed to the fact that the
relative prices that the central bank attempts to stabilize (the interest rate or the
exchange rate) are far from their equilibrium, thereby generating endogenous
movements in the money supply.Monetary Policy in Chile: A Black Box? 213
2.5 The Credit Mechanism
Empirical findings of international studies have not supported
the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the interest rate
and aggregate spending. Therefore research on the monetary policy
transmission mechanism has turned to what has been termed the
credit mechanism.22 This approach emphasizes the role of the bank-
ing system as a source of financing for small and medium-sized
companies, for which the problem of asymmetric information is
most important. Two transmission channels are proposed, namely,
the bank credit channel and the balance sheet channel.
In the credit channel model, an interest rate increase result-
ing in reduced money growth, bank reserves, and deposits will
have a contractionary effect on bank credits, depressing invest-
ment expenditure and, in turn, GDP. However, as explained above,
in an open economy a higher domestic interest rate may generate
an incentive for capital inflows, which can be intermediated by the
banking sector, thus leading to an increase in loans.
The balance sheet channel operates through a deterioration of
companies’ cash flow resulting from the interest rate increase.
This magnifies problems of adverse selection and moral hazard,
thereby reducing corporate lending.23 This, in turn, has a negative
effect on investment and, as a result, on GDP. This transmission
mechanism, together with the Phillips curve or the Australian
mechanism, suggests that an increase in the interest rate will re-
duce inflationary pressures by reducing the spending-output gap
or the gap between actual and potential output.
One example of the application of this approach is Edwards and Végh
(1997). These authors hold that, in both Chile and Mexico, the banking
sector played a fundamental role in intermediating capital flows, which
ended in an explosive growth in consumption (in Chile in the 1980s and
in Mexico in the 1990s). When capital withdrew from these countries,
banks were left with severe financial problems, which deepened the re-
cessions the countries were then suffering. The authors build a model in
which fixed exchange rate stabilization generates output and employ-
ment cycles through changes in deposit-credit spreads and in bank
22. Examples can be found in Mishkin (1995) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
23. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that this effect should be applied not
only to corporate investment expenses but also to individuals’ expenditure on
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credits. In their empirical analysis, the authors use a widening of the
spread between interest rates for credits and for deposits as a proxy
for a shock to the banking system, and they find that such a shock
negatively affects economic activity.
3. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE
TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS
3.1 Methodology
A review of the relevant literature indicates that a large majority
of recent studies on the effects of monetary policy use vector
autoregression (VAR) as their econometric tool of choice.24 However,
this methodology has been subjected to strong criticism, on the grounds
that it lacks a sufficient theoretical basis and on the grounds that its
identification procedure is questionable.With respect to the first criti-
cism, it is arguably a matter of personal preference, since none of the
econometric methodologies currently in use is totally immune from
criticism on this score. Although economic theory does establish cer-
tain relationships between variables, it seldom provides accurate pre-
dictions of the dynamics of those relationships or distinguishes between
endogenous and exogenous variables. This forces a choice between
imposing “arbitrary” constraints on the joint dynamics of the set of
variables and in selecting endogenous variables, on one hand, and adopt-
ing a totally empirical approach on the other, whereby the data “reveal”
their joint dynamic process and all variables are treated symmetri-
cally.25 The latter is the option implicit in the VAR methodology.
To understand the nature of the second type of criticism, con-
sider the following example:
, b b 1 12 1 11 10 12 y t t t t z y z y           (8)
, b b 1 22 1 21 20 21 z t t t t z y y z           (9)
24. Some examples are the works of Rosende and Herrera (1991), Bernanke
and Blinder (1992), Mendoza and Fernández (1994), Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996),
Valdés (1997), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Cochrane (1998), and Garretsen and Swank
(1998).
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where variables y and z follow a stochastic process as described by
equations (8) and (9) and y and z are innovations or “white noise.”
This system of equations, known as the structural VAR, may be de-
scribed as shown below:
, x x B 1 1 0 0 t t t ε Γ Γ      (10)
where   Σ ε ε  t t E  .




autoregressive vector is obtained in its reduced form:
, e x A A x 1 1 0 t t t      (11)
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Here the main fact worth singling out is that, given  t t ε
1
0 B e
  , every
element in the residuals vector of the reduced system is a linear combina-
tion of all the structural innovations that affect the endogenous variables
that make up the system. Therefore, the dynamic response (impulse re-
sponse function) of these endogenous variables to a shock to one of the
system’s error vector components in its reduced form cannot be linked to
any structural innovations in particular.
In the traditional VAR methodology the identification problem is
solved by placing constraints on the contemporary effects of the vari-
ables and on their variance-covariance matrix. These constraints,
'
'
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associated with Cholesky’s decomposition, assume a recursive pro-
cess, where the first variable included in the VAR system is not af-
fected contemporaneously by any of the remaining endogenous
variables, the second one is affected contemporaneously only by the
first, and so on.
If the theoretical constraints applicable to the structural dy-
namic model are such that the B0 matrix is inferior triangular,
with unit coefficients in the principal diagonal, and matrix  is
diagonal, where the values in its diagonal are the structural innova-
tions’ variances, this model will be appropriately identified using the
traditional procedure. In this case, estimates of the parameters (B0,
,  ) through the full-information maximum likelihood (FIML)
method can be obtained by maximizing the likelihood function with
respect to the estimated parameters of the reduced form. The FIML
estimation of B0 allows us to calculate the orthogonalized residuals
through the relationship t = B0et, which corresponds to the vector of
structural disturbances. Similarly, the orthogonalization of the im-
pulse response function’s coefficients will generate the dynamic con-
sequences of structural innovations. In general, however, the
constraints will not be the “true constraints” imposed by economic
theory. Thus a more flexible identification procedure is needed, to
allow the incorporation of constraints consistent with the theoretical
model being tested.26
Given the above, in a second development stage of the VAR meth-
odology more attention was paid to the identification of variables based
on economic theory; the result was the so-called structural VAR.
The leaders of this line of research were Christopher Sims, Olivier
Blanchard, Mark Watson, and Ben Bernanke. The rationale of the
structural VAR methodology is that any identification constraints being
imposed on matrixes B0 and  must come from economic theory.
Once such constraints are established, it is possible to estimate val-
ues of the structural coefficients that will both satisfy and meet
the condition given by the last of the equations above. For that
purpose the FIML method is used.27
One last methodological issue worth noting relates to the exist-
ence of conflicting ideas about whether the variables included in a
26. For further details of the VAR estimation methodology, see Hamilton
(1994).
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VAR system must be previously filtered so that they are all station-
ary, or whether they must simply be included in their “natural form.”
Some authors, such as Sims (1980) and Doan (1992), argue against
variable differentiation even when the variables have a unit root.
Their main argument is that the objective of the structural VAR is to
find any interrelationships that may exist between the variables in-
cluded in the system, and not the estimated values of parameters per
se. Similarly, they argue against variable filtering because this may
imply a loss of information about joint movements of the variables,
such as the possible existence of cointegration relationships between
them. However, the majority of the other authors hold that the vari-
ables must be used in such a way that the VAR can imitate the true
data-generating process, and therefore the variables included must
be stationary.
3.2 Identification Criteria Used
In keeping with the arguments in the previous section, the char-
acteristic element of the structural VAR methodology adopted here
is the use of identification assumptions explicitly based either on
economic theory or on institutional aspects inherent in the economy
under analysis. Therefore we first describe in detail the identifica-
tion assumptions used to estimate the various models considered
here:
• Because the data being used are monthly, the first assump-
tion is that the monetary policy instrument (the rate on the central
bank’s ninety-day instrument) does not respond contemporaneously
to variables that are not observable within the month, such as ac-
tivity variables (production and spending). However, the instrument
can respond contemporaneously to variables observed in the very
short term, such as monetary and financial variables and prices.
• Financial variables (such as the exchange rate, market in-
terest rates, and asset prices) can respond contemporaneously
to any information, including nonobservable information.28
28. Because financial variables are not the result of the decision of any one player
but arise from the interaction of many actors within their respective markets, they
can be affected by variables that, without being directly observable, do alter the
equilibrium of those markets. They can also be affected by the actors’ expectations
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• Activity variables (such as spending, output, and the spending-output
gap) respond to all the other variables with a lag; exceptions are days
worked and, in the case of GDP, the response to spending itself.29
• Prices of goods (as reflected in the overall CPI and the CPI for
nontradables) respond contemporaneously only to those variables that
affect them directly, such as the exchange rate and international
prices.30
• The real exchange rate responds contemporaneously only to
variables affecting it directly (the nominal exchange rate, interna-
tional prices, and the CPI for nontradables). This assumption is a
direct extension of the previous one.
• In the case of the monetary credit model, credit from the finan-
cial sector is assumed to respond contemporaneously to interest rates
and money (which affect the credit supply), because this is the cen-
tral transmission mechanism of monetary policy according to this
model. Credit may also respond contemporaneously to aggregate
spending, which affects the demand for credit.
3.3 Principal Results
As we have seen, the need for the variables included in a struc-
tural VAR to be stationary remains controversial. Therefore, as a
way to check the robustness of the results obtained, all the estimated
models were estimated in three versions (except for the reaction func-
tion and the Phillips curve, which were estimated only in two ver-
sions): as levels, as levels and growth rates over twelve months,31
and as levels and first differences (of levels or of the twelve-month
variation rate, depending on the type of variable).32 This also allows
29. This assumption is intended to incorporate into the models’ empirical
estimation the existence of lags in the production and spending decisionmaking
processes or in their implementation. Such lags may arise from delays in the
generation and disclosure of information on which the decisions are based, from
difficulties in their interpretation because of uncertainties (for example, with
respect to whether shocks are permanent or transitory), or from the presence of
rigidities (contractual or other) that may hinder instantaneous reactions.
30. This is one of the standard assumptions used in Keynesian models to allow
for the existence of real effects in response to nominal shocks.
31. The twelve-month variation was used in those cases where it makes
economic sense, for example with price indexes and production and spending
figures.
32. This version of the models attempted to make all the variables included
comply with the seasonality condition; this was checked using the Dickey-Fuller
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our results to be compared with a broader range of previous studies.
Appendix B summarizes the main results for the Chilean economy
reported by other authors.
For reasons of space, only the results of the version with the
most theoretical basis (the one combining variables in levels and
twelve-month growth rates) are shown, since these results are easier
to interpret. Also, and for the same reasons, only the impulse re-
sponse functions considered to be the central hypotheses associated
with each of the models estimated are discussed.33
The Central Bank’s Reaction Function. Table 2 describes the esti-
mated model. The upper panel of figure 3 shows the response of the
monetary policy rate to a 1-percentage-point increase in the cyclical
component of GDP. As the figure shows, the response is positive and
strongly significant after the fifth month from the shock. The response
peaks around 13 basis points, 15 months after the shock.
33. A complete report of the impulse response functions of this and the other
models estimated is available from the authors.
Table 2. Characteristics of the Models
Model Variables includeda Lags Sample period
Central bank’s TASA BC; CICLO; V12WUC; V12IPCSUB; seasonal Five January 1986 to
reaction function dummies; deterministic trend December 1996
Australian model LTTUC; TASABC; TBE; CICLO; LTCN; LIPCNT; Four April 1989 to
LTCRINE; seasonal dummies; deterministic trend June 1997
Credit model LTTUC; TASABC; TBE; V12M1A; V12COLOC; Three January 1987 to
V12GASTO; V12PIB; V12TCN; V12IPCSUB; June 1997
V12DHAB; seasonal dummies; deterministic trend
Monetary model: LTTUC; TASABC; TBE; V12M1A; V12IGPA; Three January 1987 to
asset prices V12GASTO; V12PIB; V12TCN; V12IPCSUB; June 1997
V12DHAB; seasonal dummies; deterministic trend
Phillips curve LTTUC; TASABC; TBE; CICLO; DV12TCN; Five February 1986
model DV12IPCSUB; seasonal dummies; deterministic to December 1996
trend
Interest rate TASABC; LIBOR; VTCREXPOST; V3TCN; V3IPC; Six January 1987 to
parity model  seasonal dummies; deterministic trend December 1997
a. See appendix C for definitions of the variables.Figure 3. Impulse Response Functions for the Central
Bank’s Reaction Function
Response of Policy Rate to Change in
Cyclical Component of GDP
Response of Policy Rate to Change in
Nominal Wage Variation
Response of Policy Rate to Change in
Core Inflation
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The middle panel of figure 3 shows the response of the monetary
policy rate to a 1-percentage-point increase in the twelve-month varia-
tion rate of nominal wages. A positive, strongly significant response
of the policy rate to a positive shock to this variable is observed. This
response reaches its maximum intensity, nearly 20 basis points, fif-
teen months after the shock.
Finally, the bottom panel of figure 3 depicts the response of the
monetary policy rate to a 1-percentage-point increase in core infla-
tion. It can be concluded that the response is positive and significant
in the period from one to seven months after the shock, and that the
maximum response appears around month 5 after the shock, when it
amounts to slightly more than 10 basis points.
The Australian Model. Table 2 again describes the main charac-
teristics of the model. The top left panel of figure 4 shows the re-
sponse of the spending-output gap to a positive shock of 50 basis points
in the monetary policy interest rate. Three conclusions can be drawn.
First, the response is negative but not large enough to be significant.
Second, this negative response extends from month 1 to month 13
after the shock. And third, at its maximum, the reduction in the gap
is 1 percentage point.
On the other hand, the next two panels of figure 4 shows the re-
sponse of the CPI for nontradables to an increase of 50 basis points in
the monetary policy interest rate. The results indicate that when the
level of the CPI for nontradables is used, the response is negative and
significant (at the 10 percent level). However, when the twelve-month
variation in the CPI for nontradables is used, the familiar “price puzzle”
appears,34 in that the response is positive. However, this response is
not large enough to be statistically significant.
The next panel of figure 4 depicts the response of the (logarithm of
the) real exchange rate to a 50-basis-point shock to the monetary policy
interest rate. A first main conclusion is that the level of the real exchange
rate increases after the fourth month, and this response is marginally
significant (at the 10 percent level). A second is that after two years the
real exchange rate is about 2 percentage points above its trend level.
The last panel of figure 4 shows the response of the real exchange
rate to a 5-percentage-point shock in the spending-output gap. The
response is negative and significant. Two years after the shock, the
real exchange rate is 1.3 percentage points below its trend level.
34. See Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) for
more on this subject.Figure 4. Impulse Response Functions for the
Australian Model
Response of Real Exchange Rate
 to Change in Spending-Output GAP
Response of Change in
Nontradables CPI to Change
in Policy Rate
Response of Real Exchange Rate
 to Change in Policy Rate
Response of Spending-Output Gap
 to Change in Policy Rate
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The Credit Model. Table 2 again describes the main characteris-
tics of the model. The top left panel of figure 5 shows the response of
the monetary aggregate M1A to a 50-basis-point increase in the mon-
etary policy interest rate. It can be concluded that the response is
negative, that the largest effect is reached six months after the shock,
and that at its maximum the response is marginally significant at the
10 percent level.
The top right panel in figure 5 depicts the response of annual
growth in financial system credit to a 50-basis-point increase in the
monetary policy rate.  The response is negative, very persistent, and
significant at the 10 percent level. The response is at its greatest
eighteen months after the shock, at which point the annual growth
rate of credit has been reduced by 0.60 percentage point.
The left-hand panel in the second row of figure 5 shows the re-
sponse of aggregate spending to a 50-basis-point shock in the mon-
etary policy rate. A lagged negative response is detected beginning in
the fourth month after the shock. However, this response is not sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level.
The right-hand panel in the second row of figure 5 shows the
response of the core CPI to an increase of 50 basis points in the mon-
etary policy rate. The response is positive, revealing again the pres-
ence of the “price puzzle,” which has been found in other studies of
the Chilean economy.35 However, the response is not significant at
the 10 percent level.
The left-hand panel in the third row of figure 5 depicts the re-
sponse of financial system credit to a positive shock to M1A of 5 per-
cent. The response is positive and achieves significance at the 10
percent level between ten and thirteen months after the shock. The
response peaks at twelve months after the shock, at which point it
is near 0.5 percentage point.
The right-hand panel in the third row of figure 5 shows the re-
sponse of aggregate spending to a positive shock to M1A of 5 percent.
The response is positive and significant at the 10 percent level and
occurs between four and thirteen months after the shock, peaking
near 1 percentage point.
The bottom left panel of figure 5 shows the response of core CPI to
a positive shock to M1A of 5 percent. A negative response is observed
between the second and the fourth month after the shock, which is
35. See Valdés (1997) and Mendoza and Fernández (1994).Figure 5. Impulse Response Functions for the Credit Model
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Response of Spending to Change
in Policy Rate
Response of Core CPI to Change
in Policy Rate
Response of Credit Growth
to Change in M1A
Response of Spending to Change
in M1A
Response of Core CPI to Change
in M1A
Response of Spending to Change
in Credit Growth
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significant at the 10 percent level. This result can be interpreted as
another indication of the so-called price puzzle. Subsequently, at the
fifth month after the shock a positive response from prices appears,
but it is not large enough to be significant.
Finally, the bottom right panel of figure 5 shows the response of
aggregate spending to a 5 percent positive shock to annual growth
in financial system credit. The response is somewhat erratic, but it
is positive in the second and fourth months after the shock, and
marginally significant at the 10 percent level. The magnitude of the
response is relatively large, peaking at around 5 percentage points.
The Monetary-Asset Price Model. Table 2 shows the main charac-
teristics of the model that we have labeled the “monetary-asset price
model.” The top left panel of figure 6 shows the response of M1A to
an increase of 50 basis points in the monetary policy interest rate.
The response becomes negative at month 5 after the shock. The larg-
est negative effect is reached at seven months; it is significant at the
10 percent level and amounts to almost 1.5 percentage points.
The top right panel of figure 6 shows the response of the
Chilean general stock price index (IGPA) to a positive shock of
50 basis points in the monetary policy rate. The response is nega-
tive and significant at the 10 percent level. The maximum re-
sponse is achieved between six and seven months after the shock,
when it equals 5 percentage points.
The left-hand panel in the second row of figure 6 shows the re-
sponse of aggregate spending to a positive shock of 50 basis points to
the monetary policy rate. A negative response appears at month 8
after the shock and is significant at the 10 percent level. The maxi-
mum effect is reached between fifteen and eighteen months after
the shock and amounts to 0.6 percentage point.
The right-hand panel in the second row of figure 6 shows the
response of the core CPI to a 50-basis-point increase in the mon-
etary policy rate.As in the credit model case, this model finds a
positive response indicative of the traditional “price puzzle.” How-
ever, in this case as well, the response does not reach significance
at the 10 percent level.
The left-hand panel in the third row of figure 6 shows the re-
sponse of the IGPA to a positive shock of 5 percentage points to
M1A. A positive response is observed between one and nine months
after the monetary shock, but it is not significant.Figure 6. Impulse Response Functions for the
Monetary-Asset Price Model
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The right-hand panel in the third row of figure 6 depicts the re-
sponse of aggregate spending to a 5 percent positive shock to M1A.
The response is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. It
occurs between four and thirteen months after the shock and peaks
at about 1 percentage point.
The bottom left panel of figure 6 shows the response of the
core CPI to a 5 percent positive shock to M1A. A negative re-
sponse is observed between the second and the fourth month after
the shock, which is marginally significant at the 10 percent level.
Once again this result can be interpreted as a manifestation of the
“price puzzle.” Subsequently, a positive response of prices appears,
but it is not significant.
Finally, the bottom right panel of figure 6 shows the response
of aggregate spending to a positive shock of 10 percent to the
IGPA. A positive response is observed, which is marginally signifi-
cant between months 3 and 6 after the shock.
The Phillips Curve Hypothesis. Table 2 again describes the
main characteristics of the model. The top left panel of figure 7
shows the response of the discrepancy between actual and poten-
tial output (that is, the business cycle) to an increase of 50 basis
points in the monetary policy rate. The response is far from sig-
nificant, and so, under this specification of the model, no system-
atic response of the cyclical component of GDP to a shock in the
monetary rate can be identified.
The top right panel of figure 7 shows the acceleration in core
inflation in response to a 50-basis-point increase in the monetary
policy rate. Although the observed response is basically positive
during the periods immediately following the shock, it is far from
significant. Thus, in this case the “price puzzle” that appears is
of a lesser degree than in the other models estimated.
The bottom left panel of figure 7 shows the acceleration in core
inflation in response to a 5-percentage-point increase in the dis-
crepancy between actual and potential output. Although at the be-
ginning (between months 3 and 4 after the shock) a negative response
is detected, it is not significant, and from month 5 onward a clearly
positive and marginally significant (at the 10 percent level) response
can be seen. This indicates the presence of a positive effect from
the cyclical component of GDP on core inflation, and therefore of228 Ángel Cabrera and Luis Felipe Lagos
what is commonly called “overheating.”36 The graph also shows that,
at its peak in month 6, the magnitude of this response is about 0.40
percentage point, and this positive effect remains until the eighteenth
month after the shock.
Finally, the bottom right panel of figure 7 shows the response
of the cyclical component of GDP to a 5-percentage-point increase
in inflation acceleration. A clearly negative response is observed,
which is significant at the 10 percent level. At its peak, this re-
sponse reaches almost 1 percentage point, and it stays negative
36. On this matter see Zahler (1994). The international academic literature
generally uses the term “gap model” to describe the empirical inflation models that
emphasize the existence of this effect. One example is Coe and McDermott (1997).
The existence of this effect supports the use of the GDP’s cyclical component as
one of the elements in the central bank’s reaction function.
Figure 7. Impulse Response Functions for the
Phillips Curve Model
Response of Output Gap to Change
in Policy Rate
Response of Change in Core
Inflation to Change in Policy Rate
Response of Change in Core Inflation
to Change in Output Gap
Response of Cyclical Component
of GDP to Change in Policy Rate
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during the first twenty-four months following the shock. This evi-
dence runs counter to the hypothesis implicit in the so-called Lucas
supply model, according to which innovations in the inflation rate
will have a positive effect on aggregate output.
The Interest Rate Parity Model. The results for this model must
be interpreted carefully. Lack of sufficient information made it
impossible to include in the estimated model either a country risk
premium or an adjustment for foreign credit reserves held less
than one year. Therefore a model specification problem may have
arisen because of omitted variables, which could alter the results.
Table 2 again describes the main characteristics of the model.
The top left panel of figure 8 shows the response of inflation to an
increase of 50 basis points in the policy interest rate. Again there
is strong evidence of a “price puzzle,” since the estimated response
is positive and highly significant.
The top right panel of figure 8 shows the response of the nominal
exchange rate to a 50-basis-point increase in the policy interest rate.
Figure 8. Impulse Response Functions for the Interest Rate
Parity Model
Response of Inflation to Change
in Policy Rate
Response of Nominal Exchange Rate
to Change in Policy Rate
Response of Nominal Exchange Rate
to Change in LIBOR
Response of Inflation to Change in
Nominal Exchange Rate Variation
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Although, as predicted by the interest rate arbitrage hypothesis, the
initial response of the exchange rate is negative, it is far from signifi-
cant. By the seventh month after the shock, moreover, a significant
positive response of the exchange rate is detected, which parallels
the behavior of the inflation response. This reveals that some degree
of nominal exchange rate indexation exists.
Similarly, the bottom left panel of figure 8 shows the response
of the nominal exchange rate to an increase of 50 basis points in
the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). In this case some slight
evidence in favor of the interest rate arbitrage hypothesis is de-
tected, since in the month of the shock itself there is a positive,
significant response. Afterward, however, the response fluctuates
around zero and is far from significant.
Finally, the bottom right panel of figure 8 shows the response
of the rate of inflation to a positive 5-percentage-point shock in
the rate of variation of the nominal exchange rate. A positive, mar-
ginally significant response is seen after three months. This re-
veals that exchange rate fluctuations have affected the path of
inflation over the period under study.
3.4 Lessons for the Effectiveness of
Monetary Policy
The results just presented lead to a number of conclusions with
respect to the effects of monetary policy on several macroeconomic vari-
ables. Here we will focus on the effects on four such variables: inflation,
output, spending, and the real exchange rate.
Monetary Policy and Inflation. The results associated with
the Australian model indicate that a positive innovation of 50
basis points in the monetary policy interest rate will provoke a
negative deviation of the CPI for nontradable goods from its trend.
The magnitude of this deviation is around 0.4 percentage point
after one year and 0.6 percentage point after two years. These
results are similar to those obtained by Rosende and Herrera (1991).
They estimate that an increase of 120 basis points in the interest
rate on bank deposits provokes a global price-level deviation from
its trend in the range of 0.43 to 0.75 percentage point, with anMonetary Policy in Chile: A Black Box? 231
estimated duration of roughly six quarters.37 Our results also seem
generally consistent with those of Eyzaguirre and Rojas (1996),
who estimate that a 100-basis-point increase in the interest rate
on bank credit will reduce inflation of nontradables by 0.3 percent-
age point after one year, and by 1 percentage point after one year
and a half.38
In contrast, the papers by Valdés (1997) and Mendoza and
Fernández (1994) find a positive response of inflation to a shock of
the same sign in the interest rate. Mendoza and Fernández point
out that, although there appears to be no systematic effect of the
interest rate on inflation, sharp increases in that rate (such as
that observed in Chile between 1988 and 1992) have a negative
effect on inflation with a nine-month lag. On the other hand, Valdés
finds a negative effect of the interest rate on the difference be-
tween actual and targeted inflation. However, in our opinion the
procedure Valdés used is inadequate, because the reported result
implies that an increase in the interest rate would provoke an
increase in the targeted rate of inflation, which makes no eco-
nomic sense. (Moreover, this increase would be larger than that
observed in actual inflation, in such a way as to reduce the differ-
ential.) Another problem is Valdés’ use of inflation projections by a
local consulting firm as a proxy for target inflation, which is very
questionable. Therefore we reconstructed the inflationary differ-
ential using the targets reported by the central bank itself from
1991 on (see Magendzo, 1997) and incorporated it into different
VAR systems; we found no systematic effect of the interest rate
on this variable.
A “price puzzle” emerges in many of the models estimated in
this paper. However, a global evaluation of our results suggests
that, as stated by Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), this puzzle may
37. Considering that the magnitude of the shock used in our estimate is only
about four-tenths that of Rosende and Herrera’s shock, and that the share of
nontradables in the overall CPI is 50 percent, it can be concluded that the responses
calculated in both studies are very similar in size. However, this conclusion holds only
if the CPI for tradables is independent from that for nontradables, a condition that is
not met in the presence of any degree of exchange rate indexation.
38. In both Rosende and Herrera (1991) and Eyzaguirre and Rojas (1996), the
shock analyzed does not originate from the true monetary policy instrument; hence
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be the result of wrong identification assumptions and of specifica-
tion problems in the VAR system.39
Monetary Policy and Economic Activity. As for the monetary
policy effects on activity indicators, our results show very weak nega-
tive responses of aggregate spending, GDP, and the cyclical compo-
nent of GDP to positive shocks in the interest rate used as a monetary
policy instrument. Only in the case of the gap between the growth
rates of spending and output is a stronger negative response de-
tected. That response lasts 13 months and reaches a maximum
(around month 8) of somewhere between 1 and 2 percentage points,
in response to an increase of 50 basis points in the policy interest
rate.
On the other hand, our results show significant positive re-
sponses of both GDP and aggregate spending to positive innova-
tions in the nominal money supply. In the case of aggregate spending,
the response is observed between the fourth and the thirteenth month
after a shock of 5 percentage points to M1A and reaches a magnitude
of 0.5 to 1 percentage point.
Rosende and Herrera (1991) find a positive effect of nominal
money on the deviation of GDP from its trend. According to their
estimates, a 3.2-percentage-point increase in the money supply
will generate a positive deviation of GDP ranging between 0.36
and 0.89 percentage points over four quarters. Similarly, they find
that an increase of 120 basis points in the interest rate on price-
level-adjustable one-year bank deposits reduces the deviation in
output by an estimated 0.97 to 1.25 percentage points after four
quarters, an effect that fades out in the seventh quarter after the
shock.40 More consistent with our results on this matter, Mendoza
and Fernández (1994) find no systematic effect of the interest rate
on one-year bank credits on the gap between actual and potential
GDP, but they do observe Granger causality from M1A to this gap.
39. When identifying assumptions consistent with our results are used, a sub-
stantial mitigation of the anomalous response of inflation appears in comparison with
the VAR systems with the traditional recursive identification (nonstructural VAR). In
addition, our results show that the strength of the “price puzzle” varies inversely with
the estimated model’s global adjustment.
40. Unfortunately, Rosende and Herrera do not report the significance bands
associated with the impulse response functions, so it is not possible to determine
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Along the line of Rosende and Herrera’s results, Eyzaguirre and
Rojas (1996) find that an increase of 100 basis points in the interest
rate on one-year bank credits reduces the growth rate of aggregate
spending by an estimated 1 percentage point in the short run. This
effect reaches an estimated 1.5 percentage points after five to six
quarters.
Finally, Valdés (1997) also finds a negative effect of the inter-
est rate on ninety-day central bank obligations on the growth rate
of output (specifically, on an approximation of IMACEC, a monthly
indicator of economic activity). Such an effect is observed for an
estimated four to fifteen months after the shock and amounts to
about 0.5 percentage point following an increase of 30 basis points
in the interest rate.
A global evaluation of these results leads to the conclusion that
the estimated response of spending and aggregate production to
shocks in the interest rate appears to be strongly influenced by
the VAR system specification used. In contrast, the effects of mon-
etary innovations appear to be more robust.
Monetary Policy and the Real Exchange Rate. The version of
the Australian model reported here shows that a positive shock of
50 basis points in the monetary policy rate provokes a positive
deviation of the real exchange rate from its trend. After a year
this deviation amounts to 1 percentage point, and after two years
it is near 2 percentage points.
The results reported by Eyzaguirre and Rojas (1996) tend to
support our own. They find a positive effect of the interest rate on
the real exchange rate and state that, after three quarters from
the shock to the interest rate, it explains around an estimated 20
percent of the forecast error of the model with respect to the real
exchange rate.41 In contrast, Mendoza and Fernández (1994) and
Valdés (1997) find no significant response of the real exchange
rate to shocks in the interest rate.42
41. Unfortunately, these authors report no estimates of the magnitude of the
real exchange rate response.
42. It must be noted that the real exchange rate definitions used by these au-
thors differ from the one used here, which is the same as that used by Eyzaguirre and
Rojas. Rosende and Herrera (1991) report no results on the effect of monetary policy
on the real exchange rate.234 Ángel Cabrera and Luis Felipe Lagos
4. CONCLUSIONS
The most robust results of our research are those on the central
bank’s reaction function. Here the evidence shows that, during the
period analyzed, the monetary authorities responded systematically
to signs of “overheating” (a discrepancy between actual and poten-
tial GDP, or a spending-output gap),43 and to direct inflation indica-
tors (nominal wages and the CPI), by increasing the interest rate
used as an instrument.
Paradoxically, the results yield weak evidence in favor of hy-
potheses whereby spending and output respond negatively to the
monetary policy instrument. Here the greatest response is found
for the spending-output gap. However, spending and output do seem
to respond systematically to shocks to the nominal money supply.
An obvious question arises about the possible convenience of rede-
fining the variable used as the monetary policy instrument.
Still more paradoxical is the evidence showing that, in the large
majority of the models estimated, inflation responds positively to
an increase in the monetary policy rate (the “price puzzle”). How-
ever, regarding the results offered by traditional VAR systems, the
use of “structural” identification assumptions allows this anomaly
to be reduced substantially, making it insignificant in most cases.
Also, within the context of the Australian model, a response that
has the expected negative sign and is significant is detected. One
can therefore speculate that the “price puzzle” phenomenon is asso-
ciated not only with the wrong selection of identification assump-
tions, but also with specification problems in the VAR system. The
anomalous result is observed with greater strength in those models
that tend to be rejected by the data in general terms.
As for the theoretical transmission mechanisms, the one that
gets the most support is that associated with the Australian model,
in that the results show a (weak) negative effect of the monetary
policy rate on the spending-output gap.44 Also, a negative effect of
43. Although this report of our analyses shows only the results obtained
regarding the response of the monetary instrument to innovations in the cyclical
component of GDP, the impulse response functions obtained with the Australian
model give evidence of a positive and significant response to shocks to the spend-
ing-output gap.
44. However, from a strict econometric point of view, the correct way to
compare the estimated models is to use nested tests. Unfortunately, this could not
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monetary policy on the price level of nontradables and a positive effect
on the level of the real exchange rate are detected. Finally, the evi-
dence shows a negative effect of the spending-output gap on the real
exchange rate (both its level and its rate of acceleration).
Monetary models, in contrast, get mixed support under both
the credit approach and the asset price approach. Consistent with
the models’ predictions, the empirical evidence shows that the mon-
etary policy rate has a negative effect on M1A, on financial system
credit in real terms, and on stock prices (real IGPA). However, the
evidence also shows that the positive relationships between mon-
etary shocks (M1A), real financial system credit, and stock prices
are weak.
Also consistent with the monetarist hypotheses, most of the mod-
els estimated show a strong positive effect of a shock in nominal
money balances on aggregate spending. Moreover, the results ob-
tained consistently show positive effects on aggregate spending as-
sociated with shocks to both financial system credit and stock prices.
Nevertheless, the monetarist view does not receive full support
for its predictions, because the evidence provides weak support of the
presumption of a negative effect of the monetary policy rate on aggre-
gate spending. Also, the results show the existence of a “price puzzle,”
although the anomalous response is insignificant more often than not.
The evidence reported here is adverse for the Phillips curve
hypothesis. The results do not allow one to propose that a “Lucas
supply” phenomenon exists, since innovations in inflationary accel-
eration provoke a clearly negative effect on the cyclical component
of GDP. Nor is a significant effect of shocks to the monetary policy
instrument detected in the cyclical component of GDP. In addition,
the same evidence shows the presence of a “price puzzle,” but as in
most of the other cases where this result appears, it is not statisti-
cally significant.
However, the evidence on the model that we call the Phillips
curve model does show a strong positive effect on the acceleration
of core inflation resulting from a shock to the cyclical component of
GDP. This is the primary prediction arising from the empirical in-
flation models based on the “overheating” hypothesis (the gap model),
which for many is another version of the Phillips curve.45
45. See Coe and McDermott (1997).236 Ángel Cabrera and Luis Felipe Lagos
The hypothesis that gets the least empirical support from the
models estimated is the interest rate parity hypothesis.46 The re-
sults show that the sign of the nominal exchange rate’s response
to shocks to the domestic interest rate is the opposite of the ex-
pected one. In addition, its response to shocks to the foreign in-
terest rate is very weak. Finally, in the estimated versions of this
model the presence of the “price puzzle” is strong.
Finally, the above comparison of the models indicates that there
is no presumption that the transmission mechanisms analyzed are
intrinsically incompatible with each other. Indeed, theory shows
that, in general, they can appear simultaneously. Rather the true
purpose of our comparison has been to determine which of the theo-
retical transmission channels have manifested themselves with the
greatest strength over a specific period of Chile’s economic history.
46. As mentioned above, this may be due to specification problems in the
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Goal
Current account (1985-89); inflation
(from 1989 on)
Inflation
Current account deficit no greater
than 3 to 4 percent of GDP; gradual
reduction of inflation
In the 1980s, real exchange rate; in
the 1990s, real exchange rate,
current account deficit no greater
than 3 to 4 percent of GDP, and
inflation
“High” real exchange rate and
current account (1985-89); medium-
and long-term equilibrium of real
exchange rate (1990s); inflation;
current account deficit no larger
than 3 to 4 percent of GDP
Inflation; medium- and long-term
current account deficit no larger
than 3 to4 percent of GDP.
Transmission mechanism
Not disclosed
PRBC rate affects market rates and M1A
growth rate. This affects the spending-
output gap, thereby determining inflation.
The authors propose as an alternative
mechanism one whereby unexpected
inflation affects output trend deviations
and inflation
PRBC rate affects market credit rates,
which influence the expansion of
aggregate spending. This ultimately
affects price and wage inflation
Market rates are closely linked to central
bank’s short rate. Market rates affect
spending and thereby affect the inflation
rate
The rate has informational properties and
affects the spending-output gap, which
determines the inflationary trend
Interest rate affects spending growth,
which in turn affects inflation.






On the real exchange rate
No results from the VAR
relating to the effects of
monetary variables on the
real exchange rate are
reported.
No systematic responses
to shocks in the UF
interest rate or to the
growth-rate of M1A are
reported.
On inflation
A 120-basis-point increase in
the interest rate has a
negative effect on price-level
deviation from trend in the
range of 0.43 to 0.75
percentage point and lasts
around six quarters
After four quarters, 45
percent of the variance in
price-level deviations is
attributable to shocks on real
exchange rate, and 12 percent
to shocks to the interest rate.
Money explains a mere 0.64
percent of variance
The interest rate has no
Granger causality on the
inflation rate for twelve
months
M1A has no Granger
causality on inflation, but
inflation does cause M1A.
Weak evidence exists that
the gap between actual and
potential output has a
Granger causality on
inflation
Effect of monetary policy
On economic activity
A 120-basis-point increase in the interest
rate reduces the deviation of output from its
trend by 0.97 to 1.25 percentage points after
four quarters. This effect is transitory,
lasting roughly six quarters
A positive 3.2-percentage-point shock to
the money supply increases the deviation of
output from its trend by an estimated 0.36 to
0.89 percentage point over four quarters.
After four quarters, shocks to money explain
an estimated 22 percent of the variance of
GDP, whereas shocks to the interest rate
explain 14 percent. In the medium run (eight
to sixteen quarters) the real exchange rate
explains nearly 43 percent of output variance
The interest rate has no Granger causality on
the output gap
The M1A’s twelve-month growth rate has
Granger causality on the output gap, but not
vice versa
Unexpected inflation has Granger causality
on the output gap (impulse response analyses
show that the relationship is negative)
No systematic effect is found of the UF
interest rate on the output gap
Only sharp interest rate increases (1988-
92) induce an output gap reduction, with a lag
of nine months
Methodology
The 90- to 365-day inflation-
adjustable deposit rate is used as
a proxy for the monetary policy
instrument
Quarterly data are used for
the period from 1978 Q1 to 1990
Q 2
A VAR system is estimated
that includes the exchange rate,
interest rate, the real exchange
rate (central bank), CPI, M1A,
GDP
Variable deviations from the
trend are used (Kydland and
Prescott’s filter)
The 90- to 365-day inflation-
adjustable deposit rate is used as
a proxy for the monetary policy
instrument
Quarterly data are used for




objectives (money, output gap);
intermediate objectives- inflation;
interest rate- inflation. VAR:
interest rate;
APPENDIX B
Empirical Results of Selected Studies of Monetary Policy in ChileEyzaguirre and
Rojas (1996)
No systematic effect is found
on inflation from an increased
interest rate (in fact, the VAR
shows an initial positive
response)
Only sharp interest rate
increases (1988-92) induce a
drop in inflation, with a nine-
month lag
A 1-percentage-point increase in
the spending-output gap
increases nontradables inflation
by 0.25 percentage point during
the two to three months
following the shock. This effect
amounts to an estimated 0.5 to
0.6 percentage point after five to
six quarters
A 100-basis-point increase in
the credit interest rate reduces
nontradables inflation by 0.3
percentage point after one year,
accumulating a 1-percentage-
point reduction after eighteen
months from the shock
Innovations in the spending-
output gap explain an estimated
An increase of 100 basis
points in the credit rate
is expected to reduce the
growth rate of spending
by 1 percentage point in
the short run. This effect
increases to 1.5
percentage points after
five to six quarters.
Innovations in the
credit rate explain 25
percent of variance in
spending, and the
greatest impact occurs




rate, and the spending-
output gap explain 20 to
24 percent each of the




foreign rates explains no
significant fraction of the
variance
twelve-month variation rate of M1A; actual
seasonally adjusted output gap-trend; twelve-
month inflation rate; real exchange rate; terms
of trade (exogenous variable)
The 30- to 90-day inflation-adjustable deposit
rate is used as a proxy for the monetary policy
instrument
Quarterly data from 1998 Q1 to 1995 Q4
Simple correlation analysis between the 90-
day PRBC rate, the 30- to 365-day bank credit
rate, and a hybrid foreign interest rate
(looking for association)
Decomposition of the variance of the 90-day
PRBC rate, the 90- to 365-day bank credit rate,
and a hybrid foreign interest rate (looking for
causality)
OLS regression of first difference of
spending against own lags and disposable
income, the credit rate, and the foreign rate.
Variance analysis of spending forecast error
OLS regression of nontradables inflation
against own lags and lags of the
Author On the real exchange rate On inflation
Effect of monetary policy




(continued)Author On the real exchange rate On inflation
Effect of monetary policy
On economic activity Methodology
R. Valdés (1997)
50 percent of variance in
nontradables inflation
after four quarters
The monetary policy rate
has a reported negative
transitory effect (between
months 6 and 12) on the
gap between core and
target inflation. A 30-
basis-point rise in the rate




effect on the level of core
inflation.
Transitory negative effect
(between months 4 and 15)
on the growth rate of the
IMACEC. A 30-basis-point
increase in the interest
rate reduces the IMACEC’s





(between months 7 and 18)
on spending-output gap.
No significant effect
 spending-output gap, wages, the exchange rate,
and tradables inflation; variance analysis of
nontradables inflation forecast errors
OLS regression of real exchange rate against
mean productivity lags, the credit rate, the
domestic-foreign rate differential, and the
spending-output gap; variance analysis of the real
exchange rate forecast error
Monthly data: January 1985 to August 1996
The 90-day PRBC rate and the interbank rate are
used as a proxy for the monetary policy instrument
“Semistructural” VARs: interest rate; core-
target inflation gap; IMACEC twelve-month
variation rate; real exchange rate twelve-month
variation rate; M1A twelve-month variation rate;
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APPENDIX C
Variable Nomenclature and Description
BRECHA Difference between the twelve-month percentage variation of spending and
output (from the Central Bank of Chile)
CICLO Difference between the logarithms of seasonally adjusted GDP and potential GDP
DTASABC First difference of ninety-day PRBC
DTBE First difference of eight-year PRC
DV12IPCSUB First difference of the twelve-month percentage variation in the IPCSUB
DV12TCN First difference of the twelve-month percentage variation in the TCN
DV12IPCNT First difference of the V12IPCNT variable
DV12TCRINE First difference of the V12TCRINE variable
LCOLOC Logarithm of real actual credit of the financial system (from the Superintendency
of Banks and Financial Institutions)
LDHAB Logarithm of working days (authors’ calculations)
LGASTO Logarithm of aggregate spending in millions of 1986 pesos (from the Central
Bank of Chile)
LIBOR Ninety-day London interbank offered rate deflated by U.S. inflation (from the
Central Bank of Chile)
LIGPA Logarithm of the real general stock price index (IGPA)
LIPCNT Logarithm of the nontradables price index (from the National Institute of
Statistics)
LM1A Logarithm of the money aggregate M1A (from the Central Bank of Chile)
LIPCSUB Logarithm of the core price index (from the Pontifical Catholic University data
base)
LPIB Logarithm of GDP in millions of 1986 pesos (from the Central Bank of Chile)
LTCN Logarithm of the nominal exchange rate (from the Central Bank of Chile)
LTCRINE Logarithm of the real exchange rate, defined as the ratio of the price index for
tradables to that for nontradables (from the National Institute of Statistics)
LTTUC Logarithm of the terms of trade (from the Pontifical Catholic University data
base)
TASABC Ninety-day PRBC rate (from the Central Bank of Chile)242 Ángel Cabrera and Luis Felipe Lagos
TBE Eight-year PRC rate (from the Central Bank of Chile)
VTCREXPOST Ninety-day ex post variation of the real exchange rate, defined as the ninety-day
ex post variation of the TCN, plus the ninety-day variation of the U.S. CPI, less
the ninety-day ex post variation of the Chilean CPI (“ex post” refers to the
variables being advanced by one quarter)
V3IPC Ninety-day percentage variation in the CPI
V3TCN Ninety-day percentage variation in the TCN
V12COLOC Twelve-month variation in actual credit in real terms
V12DHAB Twelve-month variation in working days
V12GASTO Twelve-month variation in spending
V12IGPA Twelve-month variation in the real IGPA
V12IPCNT Twelve-month percentage variation in the nontradables CPI
V12IPCSUB Twelve-month variation in the core CPI
V12M1A Twelve-month variation in the money aggregate M1A
V12PIB Twelve-month variation in GDP
V12TCN Twelve-month variation in the nominal exchange rate
V12TCRINE Twelve-month variation in the real exchange rate
V12WUC Twelve-month variation in nominal wages (from the National Institute of
Statistics)
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